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Abstract
We introduce the framework of qualitative optimization prob-
lems (or, simply, optimization problems) to represent prefer-
ence theories. The formalism uses separate modules to de-
scribe the space of outcomes to be compared (the generator)
and the preferences on outcomes (the selector). We consider
two types of optimization problems. They differ in the way
the generator, which we model by a propositional theory, is
interpreted: by the standard propositional logic semantics,
and by the equilibrium-model (answer-set) semantics. Un-
der the latter interpretation of generators, optimization prob-
lems directly generalize answer-set optimization programs
proposed previously. We study strong equivalence of opti-
mization problems, which guarantees their interchangeability
within any larger context. We characterize several versions
of strong equivalence obtained by restricting the class of op-
timization problems that can be used as extensions and es-
tablish the complexity of associated reasoning tasks. Under-
standing strong equivalence is essential for modular repre-
sentation of optimization problems and rewriting techniques
to simplify them without changing their inherent properties.
Introduction
We introduce the framework of qualitative op-
timization problems in which, following the de-
sign of answer-set optimization (ASO) programs
(Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2003), we use
separate modules to describe the space of outcomes to
be compared (the generator) and the preferences on the
outcomes (the selector). In all optimization problems
we consider, the selector module follows the syntax and
the semantics of preference modules in ASO programs,
and the generator is given by a propositional theory. If
this propositional theory is interpreted according to the
standard propositional logic semantics, that is, outcomes
to be compared are models of the generator, we speak
about the classical optimization problems (CO problems,
for short). If the generator theory is interpreted by the
semantics of equilibrium models (Pearce 1997), also known
as answer sets (Ferraris 2005), that is, it is the answer sets
of the generator that are being compared, we speak about
answer-set optimization problems (ASO problems, for
short).
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Representing and reasoning about preferences in quali-
tative settings is an important research area for knowledge
representation and qualitative decision theory. The main ob-
jectives are to design expressive yet intuitive languages to
model preferences, and to develop automated methods to
reason about formal representations of preferences in these
languages. The literature on the subject of preferences is
vast. We refer the reader to the special issue of Artificial In-
telligence Magazine (Goldsmith and Junker 2008) for a col-
lection of overview articles and references.
Understanding when optimization problems are equiva-
lent, in particular, when one can be interchanged with an-
other within any larger context, is fundamental to any pref-
erence formalism. Speaking informally, optimization prob-
lems P and Q are interchangeable or strongly equivalent
when for every optimization problem R (context), P ∪ R
and Q ∪ R define the same optimal models. Understanding
when one optimization problem is equivalent to another in
this sense is essential for preference analysis, modular pref-
erence representation, and rewriting techniques to simplify
optimization problems into forms more amenable to pro-
cessing, without changing any of their inherent properties.
Let us consider a multi-agent setting, in which agents com-
bine their preferences on some set of alternatives with the
goal of identifying optimal ones. Can one agent in the en-
semble be replaced with another so that the set of optimal
alternatives is unaffected not only now, but also under any
extension of the ensemble in the future? Strong equivalence
of agents’ optimization problems is precisely what is needed
to guarantee this full interchangeability property!
The notion of strong equivalence is of general inter-
est, by no means restricted to preference formalisms. In
some cases, most notably for classical logic, it coincides
with equivalence, the property of having the same mod-
els. However, if the semantics is not monotone, that
is, extending the theory may introduce new models, not
only eliminate some, strong equivalence becomes a strictly
stronger concept, and the one to adopt if theories being
analyzed are to be placed within a larger context. The
nonmonotonicity of the semantics is the salient feature of
nonmonotonic logics (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1993) and
strong equivalence of theories in nonmonotonic logics, es-
pecially logic programming with the answer-set seman-
tics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), was extensively stud-
ied in that setting (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001;
Turner 2003; Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007). Preference
formalisms also often behave nonmonotonically as adding
a new preference may cause a non-optimal outcome
(model) to become an optimal one. Thus, in prefer-
ence formalisms, equivalence and strong equivalence are
typically different notions. Accordingly, strong equiva-
lence was studied for logic programs with rule prefer-
ences (Faber and Konczak 2006), programs with ordered
disjunction (Faber, Tompits, and Woltran 2008) and pro-
grams with weak constraints (Eiter et al. 2007).
We extend the study of strong equivalence to the formal-
ism of qualitative optimization problems. The formalism is
motivated by the design of answer-set optimization (ASO)
programs of Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski (2003). It
borrows two key features from ASO programs that make
it an attractive alternative to the preference modeling ap-
proaches based on logic programming that we mentioned
above. First, following ASO programs, optimization prob-
lems provide a clear separation of hard constraints, which
specify the space of feasible outcomes, and preferences (soft
constraints) that impose a preference ordering on feasible
outcomes. Second, optimization problems adopt the syn-
tax and the semantics of preference rules of ASO programs
that correspond closely to linguistic patterns of simple con-
ditional preferences used by humans.
The separation of preference modules from hard-
constraints facilitates eliciting and representing preferences.
It is also important for characterizing strong equivalence.
When a clear separation is not present, like in logic pro-
grams with ordered disjunctions, strong equivalence char-
acterizations are cumbersome as they have to account for
complex and mostly implicit interactions between hard con-
straints and preferences. For optimization problems, which
impose the separation, we have “one-dimensional” forms of
strong equivalence, in which only hard constraints or only
preferences are added. These “one-dimensional” concepts
are easier to study yet provide enough information to con-
struct characterizations for the general case.
Main Contributions. (1) We propose a general framework
of qualitative optimization problems, extending in several
ways the formalism of ASO programs. We focus on two im-
portant instantiations of the framework, the classes of clas-
sical optimization (CO) problems and answer-set optimiza-
tion (ASO) problems. The latter one directly generalizes
ASO programs. (2) We characterize the concept of strong
equivalence of optimization problems relative to changing
selector modules. The characterization is independent of the
semantics of generators and so, applies both to CO and ASP
problems. We also characterize strong equivalence relative
to changing generators (with preferences fixed). In this case,
not surprisingly, the characterization depends on the seman-
tics of generators. However, we show that the dependence
is quite uniform, and involves a characterization of strong
equivalence of generators relative to their underlying se-
mantics, when they are considered on their own as proposi-
tional theories. Finally, we combine the characterizations of
the “one-dimensional” concepts of strong equivalence into a
characterization of the general “combined” notion. (3) We
develop our results for the case when preferences are ranked.
In practice, preferences are commonly ranked due to the hi-
erarchical structure of preference providers. The general
case we study allows for additions of preferences of ranks
from a specified interval [i, j]. This covers the case when
only some segment in the hierarchy of preference providers
is allowed to add preferences (top decision makers, middle
management, low-level designers), as well as the case when
there is no distinction between the importance of preferences
(the non-ranked case). (4) We establish the complexity of
deciding whether two optimization problems are strongly
equivalent relative to changing selectors, generators, or both.
We present only proof sketches and some of the simpler and
not overly technical proofs in the main text. Detailed proofs
can be found in the Appendix.
Optimization Problems
A qualitative optimization problem (an optimization prob-
lem, from now on) is an ordered pair P = (T, S), where T
is called the generator and S the selector. The role of the
generator is to specify the family of outcomes to be com-
pared. The role of the selector S is to define a relation ≥
on the set of outcomes and, consequently, define the notion
of an optimal outcome. The relation ≥ induces relations >
and ≈: we define I > J if I ≥ J and J 6≥ I , and I ≈ J if
I ≥ J and J ≥ I . For an optimization problem P , we write
P g and P s to refer to its generator and selector, respectively.
Generators. As generators we use propositional theories in
the language determined by a fixed countable universe U ,
a boolean constant ⊥, and boolean connectives ∧, ∨ and
→, and where we define the constant ⊤, and the connec-
tives ¬ and ↔ in the usual way.1 Models of the genera-
tor, as defined by the semantics used, represent outcomes
of the corresponding optimization problem. We consider
two quite different semantics for generators: the classical
propositional logic semantics and the semantics of equilib-
rium models (Pearce 1997). Thus, outcomes are either mod-
els or equilibrium models, depending on the semantics cho-
sen. The first semantics is of interest due to the fundamen-
tal role and widespread use of classical propositional logic,
in particular, as a means to describe constraints. Equilib-
rium models generalize answer sets of logic programs to
the case of arbitrary propositional theories (Pearce 1997;
Ferraris 2005) and are often referred to as answer sets. The
semantics of equilibrium models is important due to the
demonstrated effectiveness of logic programming with the
semantics of answer sets for knowledge representation ap-
plications. We use the terms equilibrium models and answer
sets interchangeably.
Throughout the paper, we represent interpretations of U
as subsets of U . We write I |= φ to state that an interpreta-
tion I ⊆ U is a (classical propositional) model of a formula
φ. Furthermore, we denote the set of classical models of a
formula or theory T by Mod(T ).
1While the choice of primitive connectives is not common for
the language of classical propositional logic, it is standard for the
of logic here-and-there which underlies the answer-set semantics.
Equilibrium models arise in the context of the proposi-
tional logic of here-and-there, or the logic HT for short
(Heyting 1930). We briefly recall here definitions of con-
cepts, as well as properties of the logic HT that are directly
relevant to our work. We refer to the papers by Pearce (1997)
and Ferraris (2005) for further details.
The logic HT is a logic located between the intuitionistic
and the classical logics. Interpretations in the logic HT are
pairs 〈I, J〉 of standard propositional interpretations such
that I ⊆ J . We write 〈I, J〉 |=HT φ to denote that a formula
φ holds in an interpretation 〈I, J〉 in the logic HT. The rela-
tion |=HT is defined recursively as follows: for an atom a,
〈I, J〉 |=HT a if and only if a ∈ I . The cases of the boolean
connectives ∧ and ∨ are standard, and 〈I, J〉 |=HT ϕ → ψ
if and only if J |= ϕ → ψ (classical satisfiability) and
〈I, J〉 6|=HT ϕ or 〈I, J〉 |=HT ψ. Finally, 〈I, J〉 6|=HT ⊥.
An equilibrium model or answer set of a propositional
theory T is a standard interpretation I such that 〈I, I〉 |=HT
T and for every proper subset J of I , 〈J, I〉 6|=HT T . An-
swer sets of a propositional theory T are also classical mod-
els of T . The converse is not true in general.
We denote the set of all answer sets of a theory T by
AS(T ), and the set of all HT-models of T by ModHT (T ),
that is, ModHT (T ) = {〈I, J〉 | I ⊆ J, 〈I, J〉 |=HT T }.
For each of the semantics there are two natural concepts
of equivalence. Two theories T1 and T2 are equivalent if
they have the same models (classical or equilibrium, respec-
tively). They are strongly equivalent if for every theory S,
T1 ∪S and T2 ∪S have the same models (again, classical or
equilibrium, respectively).
For classical semantics, strong equivalence and
equivalence coincide. It is not so for the se-
mantics of equilibrium models. The result by
Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde (2001) states that two
theories T1 and T2 are strongly equivalent for equilibrium
models if and only if T1 and T2 are equivalent in the logic
HT, that is ModHT (T1) = ModHT (T2).
We call optimization problems under the classical inter-
pretation of generators classical optimization problems or
CO problems, for short. When we use the answer-set seman-
tics for generators, we speak about answer-set optimization
problems or ASO problems, for short.
Selectors. We follow the definitions
of preference modules in ASO programs
(Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2003), adjusting
the terminology to our more general setting. A selector is a
finite set of ranked preference rules
φ1 > · · · > φk
j
← ψ (1)
where k and j are positive integers, and φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
and ψ are propositional formulas over U . For a rule r of the
form (1), the number j is the rank of r, denoted by rank(r),
hd(r) = {φ1, . . . , φk} is the head of r and ψ is the body of
r, bd(r). Moreover, we write hd i(r) to refer to formula φi.
If rank(r) = 1 for every preference rule r in a selector
S, then S is a simple selector. Otherwise, S is ranked. We
often omit “1” from the notation “ 1←” for simple selectors.
For a selector S, and i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} ∪ {∞}, we define
S[i,j] = {r ∈ S | i ≤ rank(r) ≤ j} (where we assume
that for every integer k, k <∞) and write [i, j] for the rank
interval {k | i ≤ k ≤ j}. We extend this notation to op-
timization problems. For P = (T, S) and a rank interval
[i, j], we set P[i,j] = (T, S[i,j]). For some rank intervals we
use shorthands, for example = i for [i, i], < i for [1, i − 1],
≥ i for [i,∞], and similar.
For an interpretation I , a satisfaction degree of a pref-
erence rule r is vI(r) = min{i | I |= hd i(r)}, if
I |= bd(r) and I |=
∨
hd(r); otherwise, the rule
is irrelevant to I , and vI(r) = 1. We note that
Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski (2003) represented the
satisfaction degree of an irrelevant rule by a special non-
numeric degree, treated as being equivalent to 1. The differ-
ence is immaterial and the two approaches are equivalent.
Selectors determine a preference relation on interpreta-
tions. Given interpretations I and J and a simple selector S,
I ≥S J holds precisely when for all r ∈ S, vI(r) ≤ vJ (r).
Therefore, I >S J holds if and only if I ≥S J and there
exists r ∈ S such that vI(r) < vJ (r); I ≈S J if and only if
for every r ∈ S, vI(r) = vJ(r).
Given a ranked selector S, we define I ≥S J if for every
preference rule r ∈ S, vI(r) = vJ(r), or if there is a rule
r′ ∈ S such that the following three conditions hold:
1. vI(r′) < vJ (r′)
2. for every r ∈ S of the same rank as r′, vI(r) ≤ vJ (r)
3. for every r ∈ S of smaller rank than r′, vI(r) = vJ(r).
Moreover, I >S J if and only if there is a rule r′ for which
the three conditions above hold, and I ≈S J if and only
if for every r ∈ S, vI(r) = vJ(r). Given an optimization
problem P = (T, S) we often write ≥P for ≥S (and simi-
larly for > and ≈).
Optimal (preferred) outcomes. For an optimization prob-
lem P , µ(P ) denotes the set of all outcomes of P , that is,
the set of all models (under the selected semantics) of the
generator of P . Thus, µ(P ) stands for all models of P in
the framework of CO problems and for all answer sets of P ,
when ASO problems are considered. A model I ∈ µ(P ) is
optimal or preferred for P if there is no model J ∈ µ(P )
such that J >P I . We denote the set of all preferred models
of P by pi(P ).
Relation to ASO programs. Optimization prob-
lems extend the formalism of ASO programs
(Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2003) in several
ways. First, the generator programs are arbitrary propo-
sitional theories. Under the semantics of equilibrium
models, our generators properly extend logic programs
with the answer-set semantics used as generators in ASO
programs. Second, the selectors use arbitrary propositional
formulas for options in the heads of preference rule, as
well as for conditions in their bodies. Finally, optimization
problems explicitly allow for alternative semantics of
generators, a possibility mentioned but not pursued by
Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski (2003).
Notions of Equivalence. We define the union of optimiza-
tion problems as expected, that is, for P1 = (T1, S1) and
P2 = (T2, S2), we set P1 ∪ P2 = (T1 ∪ T2, S1 ∪ S2).
Two optimization problems P1 and P2 are strongly equiva-
lent with respect to a classR of optimization problems (con-
texts) if for every optimization problemR ∈ R, pi(P1∪R) =
pi(P2 ∪R).
We consider three general classes of contexts. First and
foremost, we are interested in the class LU of all optimiza-
tion problems over U . We also consider the families LgU
and LsU of all optimization problems of the form (T, ∅) and
(∅, S), respectively. The first class consists of optimiza-
tion problems where all models of the generator are equally
preferred. We call such optimization problems generator
problems. The second class consists of optimization prob-
lems in which every interpretation of U is an acceptable out-
come. We call such optimization problems selector prob-
lems. These “one-dimensional” contexts provide essential
insights into the general case. For the first class, we simply
speak of strong equivalence, denoted ≡sg. For the latter two
classes, we speak of strong gen-equivalence, denoted ≡g,
and strong sel-equivalence, denoted≡s, respectively.
Constraining ranks of rules in selectors gives rise to two
additional classes of contexts parameterized using rank in-
tervals [i, j]:
1. Ls,[i,j]U = {(∅, S) ∈ LsU | S = S[i,j]}
2. L[i,j]U = {(T, S) ∈ LU | S = S[i,j]}
The first class of contexts gives rise to strong sel-
equivalence with respect to rules of rank in [i, j], denoted
by ≡s,[i,j]. The second class of contexts yields the con-
cept of strong equivalence with respect to rules of rank in
[i, j]. We denote it by ≡s,[i,j]g . We call problems in the class
L=1U = L
[1,1]
U simple optimization problems.
Examples
We present now examples that illustrate key issues relevant
to strong equivalence of optimization problems. They point
to the necessity of some conditions that appear later in char-
acterizations of strong equivalence and hint at some con-
structions used in proofs. In all examples except for the last
one, we consider simple CO problems. In all problems only
atoms explicitly listed matter, so we disregard all others.
Example 1 Let P1 = (T1, S1), where T1 = {a ↔ ¬b}
and S1 = {a > b ←}. There are two outcomes here, {a}
and {b}, that is, µ(P1) = {{a}, {b}}. Let r be the only
preference rule in S1. Clearly, v{a}(r) = 1 and v{b}(r) =
2. Thus, {a} >P1 {b} and so, pi(P1) = {{a}}.
In addition, let P2 = (T2, S1), where T2 = {a ∧ ¬b}
and S1 is as above. Then, µ(P1) = {{a}} and, trivially,
pi(P1) = {{a}}. It follows that P1 and P2 are equivalent,
as they specify the same optimal outcomes. However, they
are not strongly gen-equivalent (and so, also not strongly
equivalent). Indeed, let R = ({¬a}, ∅). Then µ(P1 ∪R) =
{{b}} and so, pi(P1 ∪ R) = {{b}}. On the other hand,
µ(P2 ∪R) = ∅ and, therefore, pi(P2 ∪R) = ∅.
Example 1 suggests that we must have µ(P1) = µ(P2)
if problems P1 and P2 are to be strongly (gen-)equivalent.
Otherwise, by properly selecting the context generator, we
can eliminate all outcomes in one problem still leaving some
in the other.
Example 2 Let P3 = (T3, S3), where T3 = {a∨b∨c,¬(a∧
b),¬(a∧ c),¬(b∧ c)} and S3 = {a > b←, a > c←}. We
have µ(P3) = {{a}, {b}, {c}}. In addition, {a} >P3 {b},
{a} >P3 {c}, and {b} and {c} are incomparable. Thus,
pi(P3) = {{a}}. Let now P4 = (T4, S4), where T4 = T3
and S4 = {a > b > c ←}. Clearly, µ(P4) = µ(P3) =
{{a}, {b}, {c}}. Moreover, {a} >P4 {b} >P4 {c}. Thus,
pi(P4) = {{a}} and so, P3 and P4 are equivalent. They are
not strongly (gen-)equivalent. Indeed, let R = ({¬a}, ∅).
Then, pi(P3∪R) = {{b}, {c}} and that pi(P4∪R) = {{b}}.
This example suggests that for two optimization problems
to be strongly (gen-)equivalent, they have to define the same
preference relation > on outcomes.
Example 3 Let P5 = (T5, S5), where T5 = {a,¬b} and
S5 = ∅. We have µ(P5) = {{a}} and so, pi(P5) = {{a}}.
It follows that P5 is equivalent to P1. Let R = (∅, {b >
a ←}). Since µ(P5 ∪ R) = µ(P5) = {{a}}, pi(P5 ∪ R) =
{{a}}. Further, P1 ∪ R = (T1, {a > b ←, b > a ←})
and so, µ(P1 ∪ R) = µ(P1) = {{a}, {b}}) and we get
pi(P1 ∪R) = {{a}, {b}}. Thus, P5 and P1 are not strongly
(sel-)equivalent.
Informally, this example shows that by modifying the se-
lector part, we can make non-optimal outcomes optimal.
Thus, as in the case of strong gen-equivalence (Example 1)
the equality of sets of models (i.e., equivalence) is important
for strong (sel-)equivalence (a more refined condition will
be needed for ranked programs, as we show in Theorem 2).
Example 4 For the next example, let us consider problems
P6 = (T1, S6) and P7 = (T1, S7), where T1 is the generator
from Example 1, S6 = {a > b ←, b > a ←} and S7 = ∅.
We have µ(P6) = µ(P7) = {{a}, {b}}. Moreover, {a} ≥P6
{b} and {b} ≥P6 {a}. Thus, pi(P6) = {{a}, {b}}. Since
P s7 = ∅, we also have (trivially) that {a} ≈P7 {b}. Thus,
pi(P7) = {{a}, {b}}, too, and the problems P6 and P7 are
equivalent. They are not strongly sel-equivalent, though. Let
R = (∅, {a > b ←}). Then, P6 ∪ R = P6 and so, pi(P6 ∪
R) = {{a}, {b}}. On the other hand, {a} >P7∪R {b}.
Thus, pi(P7 ∪R) = {{a}}.
The example suggests that for strong sel-equivalence the
equality of the relation ≥ induced by the problems consid-
ered is important. The equality of the relation > is not suf-
ficient. In our example, the relations >P6 and >P7 are both
empty and so – equal. But they are empty for different rea-
sons, absence of preference versus conflicting preferences,
which can give rise to different preferred models when ex-
tending selectors.
Our last example involves ranked problems. It is meant
to hint at issues that arise when ranked problems are consid-
ered. In the general case of ranked selectors, the equality of
the relation > induced by programs being evaluated is not
related to strong sel-equivalence in any direct way and an
appropriate modification of that requirement has to be used
together with yet another condition (cf. Theorem 2).
Example 5 Let P = (T1, S), where S = {a > b
2
←}
and P ′ = (T1, S′), where S′ = {a > b
3
←}. Clearly,
µ(P ) = µ(P ′) = {{a}, {b}} and pi(P ) = pi(P ′) = {a}.
Thus, the two problems are equivalent. They are not strongly
sel-equivalent if arbitrary selectors are allowed. For in-
stance, let R = (∅, {b > a 2←}). Adding this new pref-
erence rule to P makes {a} and {b} incomparable and so,
pi(P ∪ R) = {{a}, {b}}. On the other hand, since the new
rule has rank 2, it dominates the preference rule ofP ′, which
is of rank 3. Thus, µ(P ′ ∪R) = {{b}}. A similar effect oc-
curs with the problem R′ = (∅, {b > a 3←}). Since its only
preference rule is dominated by the only preference rule in
P , pi(P ∪ R′) = pi(P ) = {{a}}. On the other hand, {a}
and {b} are incomparable in P ′ ∪ R′ and, consequently,
pi(P ′ ∪ R′) = {{a}, {b}}. Thus, extending P and P ′ with
selectors containing rules of rank 2 or 3 may lead to differ-
ent optimal outcomes. It is so even though the relations >
induced by P and P ′ on the set of all outcomes coincide.
However, adding selectors consisting only of rules of rank
greater than 3 cannot have such an effect, since the existing
rules would dominate them. Also, adding rules of rank 1
cannot result in differing preferred answer sets, as such rules
would dominate the existing ones. Formally, the problems P
and P ′ are strongly sel-equivalent relative to selectors with
preference rules of rank greater than 3 or less than 2.
Strong sel-equivalence
We start with the case of strong sel-equivalence, the core
case for our study. Indeed, characterizations of strong sel-
equivalence naturally imply characterizations for the general
case thanks to the following simple observation.
Proposition 1 Let P and Q be optimization problems (ei-
ther under classical or answer-set semantics for the genera-
tors) and [i, j] a rank interval. Then P ≡s,[i,j]g Q if and only
if for every generator R ∈ LgU , P ∪R ≡s,[i,j] Q ∪R.
Proof. (⇒) Let R ∈ LgU . Since P ≡s,[i,j]g Q, P ∪R ≡s,[i,j]g
Q ∪R and so, P ∪R ≡s,[i,j] Q ∪R.
(⇐) Let R be any optimization problem in L[i,j]U . We have
P ∪ R = (P ∪ (Rg, ∅)) ∪ (∅, Rs) and Q ∪ R = (Q ∪
(Rg, ∅)) ∪ (∅, Rs). By the assumption, it follows that P ∪
(Rg, ∅) ≡s,[i,j] Q ∪ (Rg, ∅). Thus,
pi((P ∪ (Rg, ∅)) ∪ (∅, Rs)) = pi((Q ∪ (Rg, ∅)) ∪ (∅, Rs)).
It follows that pi(P ∪ R) = pi(Q ∪ R) and, consequently,
that P ≡s,[i,j]g Q. ✷
Furthermore, the set of outcomes of an optimization prob-
lem P is unaffected by changes in the selector module. It
follows that the choice of the semantics for generators does
not matter for characterizations of strong sel-equivalence.
Thus, whenever in this section we refer to the set of out-
comes of an optimization problem P , we use the notation
µ(P ), and not the more specific one, Mod(Pg ) or AS (P g),
that applies to CO and ASO problems, respectively.
Our first main result concerns strong sel-equivalence rel-
ative to selectors consisting of preference rules of ranks in a
rank interval [i, j]. Special cases for strong sel-equivalence
will follow as corollaries. To state the result, we need some
auxiliary notation. For an optimization problem P , we de-
fine diff P (I, J) to be the largest k such that I ≈P<k J . If
for every k we have I ≈P<k J , then we set diff P (I, J) =
∞. It is clear that diff P (I, J) is well-defined. Moreover, as
I ≈P<1 J , diff P (I, J) ≥ 1. Furthermore, for a set V ⊆ 2U
and a relation ≻ over 2U , we write ≻V for the restriction of
≻ to V , that is, ≻V = {(A,B) ∈ ≻| A,B ∈ V }.
Theorem 2 For every ranked optimization problems P and
Q, and every rank interval [i, j], P ≡s,[i,j] Q if and only if
the following conditions hold:
1. pi(P<i) = pi(Q<i)
2. >P
pi(P<i)
= >Q
pi(Q<i)
3. For every I, J ∈ pi(P<i) such that i < diff P (I, J) or
i < diff Q(I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or both
diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) > j.
We now comment on this characterization and derive
some of its consequences. First, we observe that the con-
ditions (1) and (2) are indeed necessary — differences be-
tween pi(P<i) and pi(Q<i) or >Ppi(P<i) and >
Q
pi(Q<i)
can be
exploited to construct a selector fromLs,[i,j]U whose addition
to P andQ results in problems with different sets of optimal
outcomes. This is illustrated by Examples 3 and 4 in the
case of simple problems and simple contexts (i = j = 1),
where pi(P<i) and pi(Q<i) coincide with µ(P ) and µ(Q),
respectively. The condition (3) is necessary, too. Intuitively,
if the first ranks where P and Q differentiate between two
outcomes I and J (which are optimal for ranks less than
i) are not equal, these first ranks must both be larger than
j. Otherwise, one can find a selector with rules of ranks in
[i, j], that will make one of the interpretation optimal in one
extended problem but not in the other.
Next, we discuss some special cases of the characteriza-
tion. First, we consider the case i = 1, which allows for a
simplification of Theorem 2.
Corollary 3 For every ranked optimization problems P and
Q, and every rank interval [1, j], P ≡s,[1,j] Q if and only if
the following conditions hold:
1. µ(P ) = µ(Q)
2. >P
µ(P ) = >
Q
µ(Q)
3. For every I, J ∈ µ(P ), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or
both diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) > j.
Proof. Starting from Theorem 2, we note that the selector of
P<1 is empty and hence pi(P<1) = µ(P ). Moreover, if the
precondition i < diff P (I, J) and i < diff Q(I, J) in condi-
tion (3) of Theorem 2 is not satisfied for i = 1 and a pair
I, J ∈ µ(P ), then diff P (I, J) = 1 and diff Q(I, J) = 1
and thus the consequent is satisfied in that case as well,
which allows for omitting the precondition. ✷
If in addition j = ∞, we obtain the case of rank-
unrestricted selector contexts, and condition (3) can be sim-
plified once more, since diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) >
j never hold for j =∞.
Corollary 4 For every optimization problems P and Q,
P ≡s Q (equivalently, P ≡s,≥1 Q or P ≡s,[1,∞] Q) if
and only if the following conditions hold:
1. µ(P ) = µ(Q)
2. >Pµ(P ) = >
Q
µ(Q)
3. for every I, J ∈ µ(P ), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J).
Next, we note that if an optimization problem is simple
then diff P (I, J) > 1 if and only if diff P (I, J) =∞, which
is equivalent to I ≈P J . This observation leads to the fol-
lowing characterization of strong sel-equivalence of simple
optimization problems.
Corollary 5 For every two simple optimization problems P
and Q, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) P ≡s Q (equivalently, P ≡s,[1,∞] Q)
(b) P ≡s,=1 Q (equivalently, P ≡s,[1,1] Q)
(c) µ(P ) = µ(Q) and ≥P
µ(P )=≥
Q
µ(Q).
Proof. The implication (a)⇒(b) is evident from the defini-
tions.
(b)⇒(c) From Corollary 3 with j = 1 we directly obtain
µ(P ) = µ(Q). The condition ≥P
µ(P )=≥
Q
µ(Q) follows from
conditions (2) and (3) of that corollary. Indeed, let us con-
sider I, J ∈ µ(P ) such that I ≥P J and distinguish two
cases. If (i) diff P (I, J) = 1 then I >P J and by condi-
tion (2) of Corollary 3, also I >Q J , implying I ≥Q J . If
(ii) diff P (I, J) > 1 then by condition (3) of Corollary 3,
diff Q(I, J) > 1. Since P,Q are simple, I ≈Q J , and con-
sequently I ≥Q J . By symmetry, we also have that I ≥Q J
implies I ≥P J . Thus,≥P
µ(P )=≥
Q
µ(Q).
(c)⇒(a) From (c) it follows that >P
µ(P )=>
Q
µ(Q) and
≈P
µ(P )=≈
Q
µ(Q). Thus, the conditions (1) and (2) of Corol-
lary 4 follow. To prove the condition (3), let us first
assume diff P (I, J) > 1 for I, J ∈ µ(P ). It follows that
diff P (I, J) = ∞ and thus I ≈P
µ(P ) J . By our earlier
observation also I ≈Q
µ(Q) J and thus diff
Q(I, J) = ∞.
Hence diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J). For diff Q(I, J) > 1
we reason analogously. In the last remaining case,
diff P (I, J) = 1 and diff Q(I, J) = 1, so we directly obtain
diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J). By Corollary 4, P ≡s Q
follows. ✷
Corollary 5 shows, in particular, that for simple prob-
lems there is no difference between the relations ≡s,≥1 and
≡s,=1. This property reflects the role of preference rules
of rank 2 and higher. They allow us to break ties among
optimal outcomes, as defined by preference rules of rank
1. Thus, they can eliminate some of these outcomes from
the family of optimal ones, but they cannot introduce new
optimal outcomes. Therefore, they do not affect strong sel-
equivalence of simple problems. This property has the fol-
lowing generalization to ranked optimization problems.
Corollary 6 Let P and Q be ranked optimization problems
and let k be the maximum rank of a preference rule in P ∪Q.
Then the relations≡s,≥k and ≡s,=k coincide.
Proof. Clearly, P ≡s,≥k Q implies P ≡s,=k Q. Thus,
it is enough to prove that if P ≡s,=k Q then P ≡s,≥k Q.
To prove the condition (3), let us consider I, J ∈ pi(P<k)
such that diff P (I, J) > k. By the condition (3) of The-
orem 2, diff Q(I, J) > k. Since k is the maximum rank
of a preference rule in P or Q, diff P (I, J) = ∞ and
diff Q(I, J) = ∞. Thus, diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) (the
case diff Q(I, J) > k is similar). ✷
Our observation on the role of preference rules with ranks
higher than ranks of rules in P or Q also implies that P
and Q are strongly sel-equivalent relative to selectors con-
sisting exclusively of such rules if and only if P and Q are
equivalent (have the same optimal outcomes), and if opti-
mal outcomes that “tie” in P also “tie” in Q and conversely.
Formally, we have the following result.
Corollary 7 Let P and Q be ranked optimization problems
and let k be the maximum rank of a preference rule in P ∪
Q. Then P ≡s,≥k+1 Q if and only if pi(P ) = pi(Q) and
≈P
pi(P )=≈
Q
pi(Q).
Proof. Clearly, P<k+1 = P and Q<k+1 = Q and so,
pi(P<k+1) = pi(P ) and pi(Q<k+1) = pi(Q). Thus, the
“only-if” part follows by Theorem 2 (the condition (1) of
that theorem reduces to pi(P ) = pi(Q) and the condition (3)
implies≈P
pi(P )=≈
Q
pi(Q)). To prove the “if” part, we note that
the condition (1) of Theorem 2 holds by the assumption.
Moreover, the relations >P
pi(P ) and >
Q
pi(Q) are empty and
so, they coincide. Thus, the condition (2) of Theorem 2
holds. Finally, if I, J ∈ pi(P ), and diff P (I, J) > k + 1,
then diff P (I, J) =∞ and so, I ≈P J . By the assumption,
I ≈Q J , that is, diff Q(I, J) =∞ = diff P (I, J). The case
when diff Q(I, J) > k+1 is similar. Thus, the condition (3)
of Theorem 2 holds, too, and P ≡s,≥k+1 Q follows. ✷
Lastly, we give some simple examples illustrating how
our results can be used to “safely” modify or simplify opti-
mization problems, that is rewrite one into another strongly
sel-equivalent one.
Example 6 Let P = (T, S), where T = {a ∨ b ∨ c,¬(a ∧
b),¬(a ∧ c),¬(b ∧ c)} and S = {a > c←, b > c←}, and
P ′ = (T, S′), where S′ = {a ∨ b > c←}. Regarding these
problems as CO problems, we have that µ(P ) = µ(P ′) =
{{a}, {b}, {c}}. Moreover, it is evident that ≥Pµ(P )=≥
Q
µ(Q).
Thus, by Corollary 5, P and P ′ are strongly sel-equivalent.
In other words, we can faithfully replace rules a > c ←,
b > c ← in the selector of any optimization problem with
generator T by the single rule a ∨ b > c←.
Next, for an example of a more general principle, we note
that removing preference rules with only one option in the
head yields a problem that is strongly sel-equivalent.
Corollary 8 Let P andQ be two CO or ASO problems such
that P g = Qg and Qs is obtained from P s by removing all
preference rules with only one option in the head. Then P
and Q are strongly sel-equivalent.
Proof. The conditions (1)-(3) of Theorem 2 all follow
from an observation that for every interpretation I and
every preference rule r with just one option in the head,
vI(r) = 1. ✷
Strong gen-equivalence
We now focus on the case of strong gen-equivalence. The se-
mantics of generators makes a difference here but the differ-
ence concerns only the fact that under the two semantics we
consider, the concepts of strong equivalence are different.
Other aspects of the characterizations are the same. Specif-
ically, generators have to be strongly equivalent relative to a
selected semantics. Indeed, if the generators are not strongly
equivalent, one can extend them uniformly so that after the
extension one problem has a single outcome, which is then
trivially an optimal one, too, while the other one has no out-
comes and so, no optimal ones. Second, the preference re-
lation > defined by the selectors of the problems considered
must coincide. Thus, a single theorem handles both types of
problems.
Theorem 9 For every two CO (ASO, respectively) problems
P and Q, P ≡g Q if and only if P g and Qg are strongly
equivalent (that is, Mod(Pg) = Mod(Qg) for CO prob-
lems, and ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg) for ASO problems)
and >PMod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg).
In view of Examples 1 and 2, the result is not unexpected.
The two examples demonstrated that the conditions of the
characterization cannot, in general, be weakened.
It is clear from Corollary 4 and Theorem 9 that strong sel-
equivalence of CO problems is a stronger property than their
strong gen-equivalence.
Corollary 10 For every two CO problems P and Q, P ≡s
Q implies P ≡g Q.
In general the implication in Corollary 10 cannot be re-
versed. The problems P6 and P7 considered in Exam-
ple 4 are not strongly sel-equivalent. However, based
on Theorem 9, they are strongly gen-equivalent. Indeed,
Mod(Pg6 ) = Mod(P
g
7 ) and, writing M for Mod(P
g
6 ) =
Mod(Pg7 ), the relations >
P6
M and >
P7
M are both empty and
so, equal.
The relation between strong sel-equivalence and strong
gen-equivalence of ASO problem is more complex. In gen-
eral, neither property implies the other even if both problems
P and Q are assumed to be simple. It is so because P ≡s Q
if and only if AS(P g) = AS(Qg) and ≥P
AS(P g)=≥
P
AS(P g)
(Corollary 5), and P ≡g Q if and only of ModHT (P g) =
ModHT (Q
g) and>P
Mod(Pg)=>
P
Mod(Qg) (Theorem 9). Now,
AS(P g) = AS(Qg) (regular equivalence of programs)
does not imply ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg) (strong
equivalence) and >PMod(Pg)=>PMod(Qg) does not imply
≥P
AS(P g)=≥
P
AS(P g).
Strong equivalence — the combined case
Finally, we consider the relation ≡sg, which results from
considering contexts that combine both generators and se-
lectors. Since generators may vary here, as in the previous
section, the semantics of generators matters. But, as in the
previous section, the difference boils down to different char-
acterizations of strong equivalence of generators.
We start with a result characterizing strong equivalence of
CO and ASO problems relative to combined contexts (both
generators and selectors possibly non-empty) with selectors
consisting of rules of rank at least i and at most j, respec-
tively.
Theorem 11 For every ranked CO (ASO, respectively)
problems P and Q, and every rank interval [i, j], P ≡s,[i,j]g
Q if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. P g and Qg are strongly equivalent (that is, Mod(Pg ) =
Mod(Qg) for CO problems, and ModHT (P g) =
ModHT (Q
g) for ASO problems)
2. >P
Mod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg)
3. For every I, J ∈ Mod(P g) such that i < diff P (I, J)
or i < diff Q(I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or both
diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) > j
4. >P<i
Mod(Pg) = >
Q<i
Mod(Qg).
The corresponding characterizations for CO and ASO
problems differ only in their respective conditions (1), which
now reflect different conditions guaranteeing strong equiva-
lence of generators under the classical and answer-set se-
mantics. Moreover, the four conditions of Theorem 11 can
be obtained by suitably combining and extending the con-
ditions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 9. First, as combined
strong equivalence implies strong gen-equivalence, the con-
dition (1) is taken from Theorem 9. Second, we modify the
conditions (2) and (3) from Theorem 2 replacing pi(P<i)
with Mod(P g) (and accordingly pi(Q<i) with Mod(Qg)),
as each classical model of P g can give rise to an optimal
classical or equilibrium one upon the addition of a context,
an aspect also already visible in Theorem 9. Finally, we have
to add a new condition that the relations>P<i and>Q<i co-
incide on the sets of models of P g andQg. When generators
are allowed to be extended, one can make any two of their
models to be the only outcomes after the extension. If the
two outcomes, say I and J , are related differently by the
corresponding strict relations induced by rules with ranks
less than i, then in one extended problem, exactly one of the
two outcomes, say I , is optimal. In the other extended prob-
lem we cannot have both outcomes be optimal nor J only
be optimal as that would contradict the strong equivalence
of problems under considerations. If, however, I is the only
optimal outcome also in the other extended problem, then I
must “win” with J based on rules that have ranks at least
j. In such case, there is a way to add new preferences of
rank i that will “promote” J to be optimal too, without mak-
ing it optimal in the first problem. However, that contradicts
strong equivalence.
We conclude this section with observations concerning
the relation ≡sg for both CO and ASO problems. The con-
texts relevant here may contain preference rules of arbitrary
ranks. We start with the case of CO problems, where the re-
sults are stronger. While they can be derived from the gen-
eral theorems above, we will present here arguments relying
on results from previous sections, which is possible since for
CO problems equivalence and strong-equivalence of gener-
ators coincide.
We saw in the last section that for CO problems ≡s is a
strictly stronger relation than ≡g . In fact, for CO problems,
≡s coincides with the general relation ≡sg.
Theorem 12 For every CO problems P and Q, P ≡sg Q if
and only if P ≡s Q.
Proof. The “only-if” implication is evident. To prove the
converse implication, we will use Proposition 1 which re-
duces checking for strong equivalence to checking for strong
sel-equivalence. Let R ∈ LgU be a generator problem. Since
P ≡s Q, from Corollary 4 we have Mod(P g) = Mod(Qg).
Consequently,Mod((P ∪R)g) = Mod((Q∪R)g). Writing
M for Mod(P g) and M ′ for Mod((P ∪ R)g) we have
M ′ ⊆ M . Thus, also by Corollary 4, >P∪RM ′ =>
Q∪R
M ′ .
Finally, the condition (3) of Corollary 4 for P andQ implies
the condition (3) of that corollary for P ∪ R and Q ∪ R
(as R has no preference rules and M ′ ⊆ M). It follows,
again by Corollary 4, that P ∪ R ≡s Q ∪ R. Thus, by
Proposition 1, P ≡sg Q. ✷
In particular, Corollary 5 implies that the relations ≡sg,
≡s,=1g , P ≡
s,=1 Q, and ≡s coincide on simple CO prob-
lems.
Corollary 13 For every simple CO problems P and Q all
properties P ≡sg Q, P ≡s,=1g Q, P ≡s,=1 Q and P ≡s Q
are equivalent.
For simple ASO problems we still have that≡sg and≡s,=1g
coincide but in general these notions are different from ≡s
and ≡s,=1.
Corollary 14 For every simple ASO problems P andQ, the
following conditions are equivalent
(a) P ≡sg Q
(b) P ≡s,=1g Q
(c) ModHT (P g)=ModHT (Qg) and≥PMod(P g) = ≥QMod(Qg).
Proof. The implication (a)⇒(b) is evident.
Let us assume (b). By Theorem 11, we have
ModHT (P
g)=ModHT (Q
g). This identity implies
Mod(P g) = Mod(Qg). Let us assume that for some
I, J ∈ Mod(P g), I ≥P
Mod(P g) J . If I >
P
Mod(P g) J then, by
Theorem 11, I >Q
Mod(Qg) J and so, I ≥
Q
Mod(Qg) J . Other-
wise, I ≈P J and so, diff P (I, J) = ∞. By Theorem 11,
diff Q(I, J) > 1. Since Q is simple, diff Q(I, J) = ∞.
Thus, I ≈Q J and, also, I ≥Q
Mod(Qg) J . The converse
implication follows by symmetry. Thus, (c) holds.
Finally, we assume (c) and prove (a). To this end, we
show that the conditions (1)–(4) of Theorem 11 hold.
Directly from the assumptions, we have that condition (1)
holds. Condition (2) follows from the general fact that
for every optimization problems P and Q, and every set
V ⊆ 2U , ≥PV = ≥
Q
V implies >PV = >
Q
V . Moreover,
we also have that Mod(P g) = Mod(Qg). To prove the
condition (3), let us assume that I, J ∈ Mod(P g) and that
diff P (I, J) > 1. Since P is simple, I ≈P J . Thus, I ≈Q J
and, consequently, diff P (I, J) = ∞ = diff Q(I, J). Fi-
nally, condition (4), i.e. >P<i
Mod(Pg) = >
Q<i
Mod(Qg), obviously
holds in case i = 1 and Mod(P g) = Mod(Qg). ✷
Complexity
In this section, we study the problems of deciding the var-
ious notions of strong equivalence. Typically the compar-
isons between sets of outcomes in the characterizations de-
termine the respective complexity. We start with results con-
cerning strong sel-equivalence.
Theorem 15 Given optimization problems P andQ, decid-
ing P ≡s Q is co-NP-complete in case of CO-problems and
ΠP2 -complete in case of ASO-problems.
Proof. [Sketch] For membership, one can show that given
a pair of interpretations I, J it can be verified in poly-
nomial time (for CO-problems) or in polynomial time us-
ing an NP oracle (for ASO-problems) whether they form
a witness for the complement of the conditions stated in
Corollary 4. The main observation is that model check-
ing is polynomial for the classical semantics, but co-NP-
complete for the equilibrium semantics (Theorem 8 of
(Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)).
Hardness follows from considering the equivalence
problem for optimizations problems with empty selectors,
which is known to be co-NP-hard (for classical semantics)
and ΠP2 -hard (for equilibrium semantics, Theorem 11 of(Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). ✷
For the ranked case, we observe an increase in complex-
ity, which can be explained by the characterization given in
Theorem 2: Instead of outcome checking, this characteri-
zation involves optimal outcome checking, which is more
difficult (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
Theorem 16 Given optimization problems P and Q and a
rank interval [i, j], deciding P ≡s,[i,j] Q is ΠP2 -complete
in case of CO-problems and ΠP3 -complete in case of ASO-
problems.
Proof. [Sketch] The membership part essentially follows the
same arguments as the proof of Theorem 15, but here the
problem of checking I ∈ pi(P<i) is in co-NP for CO-
problems and in ΠP2 for ASO-problems.
For the hardness part, we reduce the following problem to
sel-equivalence of CO-problems: Given two propositional
theoriesS and T , decide whether they possess the same min-
imal models. This problem is known to be ΠP2 -complete
(e.g. Theorem 6.15 (Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007)), and
the problem remains hard if S and T are in NNF given
over the same alphabet. We adapt a construction used
in (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2011), and given a
theory T (over atoms in U ) we construct a CO problem PT
where
P gT = T [¬u/u
′] ∪ {u↔ ¬u′ | u ∈ U},
P sT = {u
′ > u←| u ∈ U},
and T [¬u/u′] stands for the theory resulting from replacing
all ¬u by u′ in T . The elements in pi(PT ) are in a one-to-one
correspondence to the minimal models of T . For theories S
and T over U it follows that S and T have the same minimal
models if and only if PS ≡s,≥2 PT .
Concerning the hardness part for ASO problems, we use
the following problem: given two open QBFs ∀Y φ(X,Y ),
∀Y ψ(X,Y ), do they possess the same minimal models.
This problem is ΠP3 -hard (see Lemma 27 in Appendix A).
For φ(X,Y ), we construct Pφ as follows:
P gφ = {z ∨ z
′ | z ∈ X ∪ Y } ∪
{(y ∧ y′)→ w,w → y, w→ y′ | y ∈ Y } ∪
{φ[¬z/z′]→ w,¬w → w},
P sφ = {x
′ > x←| x ∈ X},
where φ[¬z/z′] stands for the formula obtained by replac-
ing all ¬z by z′ in φ(X,Y ). The elements in pi(Pφ) are
in a one-to-one correspondence to the minimal models
of ∀Y φ(X,Y ). For φ and ψ over X ∪ Y we get that
∀Y φ(X,Y ) and ∀Y ψ(X,Y ) have the same minimal
models if and only if Pφ ≡s,≥2 Pψ. ✷
In Theorem 16 the rank interval [i, j] is given in input.
When fixing the interval, the hardness results still hold, pro-
vided that i > 1. In fact, the critical condition in Corol-
lary 3 is pi(P<i) = pi(Q<i); for rank intervals [1, j], the
selectors become empty and the condition is reduced to
µ(P ) = µ(Q), which is easier to decide.
The remaining problems are all in co-NP. For strong gen-
equivalence, completeness follows directly from Theorem 9
and co-NP-completeness of deciding strong equivalence be-
tween two propositional theories (for both semantics).
Theorem 17 Given two CO (ASO, respectively) problems
P and Q, deciding P ≡g Q is co-NP-complete.
Finally, for the combined case the hardness result fol-
lows from Theorem 11 and co-NP-completeness of deciding
strong equivalence of propositional theories.
Theorem 18 Given ranked CO (ASO, respectively) prob-
lems P andQ, and rank interval [i, j], deciding P ≡s,[i,j]g Q
is co-NP-complete.
By construction, all hardness results hold already for sim-
ple optimization problem.
Discussion
We introduced the formalism of optimization prob-
lems, generalizing the principles of ASO programs,
in particular, the separation of hard and soft con-
straints (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2003). We fo-
cused on two important specializations of optimization prob-
lems: CO problems and ASO problems. We studied var-
ious forms of strong equivalence for these classes of opti-
mization problems, depending on what contexts are consid-
ered. Specifically, we considered the following cases: new
preference information is added, but the hard constraints re-
main unchanged (strong sel-equivalence); hard constraints
are added but preferences remain unchanged (strong gen-
equivalence); both hard constraints and preferences can be
added (strong equivalence). To the best of our knowledge,
this natural classification of equivalences in preference for-
malisms has not been studied yet. In certain cases some of
these notions coincide (Theorem 12) but this is no longer
true when the underlying semantics is changed or ranks in
contexts are restricted.
In fact, we established characterizations of all these no-
tions of strong equivalence. They exhibit strong similarities.
The characterizations of strong sel-equivalence for CO and
ASO problems in Theorem 2 are precisely the same, mirror-
ing the fact that generators are not subject to change. The-
orem 9 concerns strong gen-equivalence for CO and ASO
problems. In each case, the characterizations consist of
two requirements: the strong equivalence of generators, and
the equality of the strict preference relations restricted to
the class of models of the generators. The only difference
comes from the fact that strong equivalence for classical and
the equilibrium-model semantics have different characteri-
zations. Theorem 11 which concerns the combined case of
strong equivalence also does not differentiate between CO
and ASO problems other than implicitly (as before, the con-
ditions of strong equivalence are different for the two seman-
tics). Moreover, the characterizations given arise in a certain
systematic way from those given in Theorems 2 and 9. This
being the case in each of the different semantics we used
strongly suggests that there are some abstract principles at
play here. We are currently pursuing this direction, con-
jecturing that this is an inherent feature of preference for-
malisms with separation of hard and soft constraints.
Our results give rise to problem rewriting methods that
transform optimization problems into strongly equivalent
ones. We provided two simple examples illustrating that ap-
plication of our results in Example 6 and Corollary 8. Sim-
ilar examples can be constructed for our results concerning
strong gen-equivalence and (combined) strong equivalence.
A more systematic study of optimization problem rewriting
rules that result in strongly equivalent problems will be a
subject of future work.
Finally, we established the complexity of deciding
whether optimization problems are strongly equivalent. No-
tably, in the general case of strong (combined) equivalence
this problem remains in co-NP for both CO and ASO prob-
lem. It is strong sel-equivalence that is computationally
hardest to test (in case of ASO problems, ΠP3 -hard). It is
so, as the concept depends of properties of outcomes that
are optimal with respect to rules of ranks less than i, while
in other cases all models have to be considered. Testing op-
timality is harder than testing for being a model, explaining
the results we obtained.
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Appendix A: Useful Lemmas
We provide here several lemmas that we use later in the
proofs of the results discussed in the main body of the paper.
The first property follows immediately from the definitions.
Lemma 19 Let P and Q be optimization problems with
>P
µ(P ) = >
Q
µ(Q). Then, pi(P ) = pi(Q).
The next lemma characterizes the relation >P∪Q for
ranked optimization problems P and Q. We recall that
diff P (I, J) is the largest k such that I ≈P<k J , where in
addition diff P (I, J) =∞, if I ≈P<k J , for every k.
Lemma 20 LetP andQ be optimization problems, and I, J
be interpretations. Then, I >P∪Q J holds if and only if one
of the following conditions holds:
1. diff P (I, J) < diff Q(I, J) and I >P J;
2. diff P (I, J) > diff Q(I, J) and I >Q J;
3. diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J), I >P J and I >Q J .
Proof. The “if” direction is evident. To prove the “only-if”
direction, we note that the cases diff P (I, J) < diff Q(I, J)
and diff P (I, J) > diff Q(I, J)
us assume diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) = i. Clearly, i < ∞
(otherwise, I ≈P∪Q J , contrary to the assumption). It
follows that for every rule r ∈ P s ∪ Qs of rank less than
i, vI(r) = vJ(r). Next, for every r ∈ P s ∪ Qs of rank i,
vI(r) ≥ vJ (r). Finally, there are rules r ∈ P s and r′ ∈ Qs,
each of rank i such that vI(r) 6= vJ(r) and vI(r′) 6= vJ (r′)
(since diff P (I, J) = i and diff Q(I, J) = i). It follows that
vI(r) < vJ (r) and vI(r′) < vJ(r′). Thus, I >P J and
I >Q J , as needed. ✷
Lemma 21 For every optimization problem P and every
i ≥ 1, pi(P<i) ⊇ pi(P ).
Proof. Let us assume that I /∈ pi(P<i). Then, there
is an interpretation J ∈ µ(P<i) such that J >P<i I .
Thus, there is a rule r ∈ P s<i, say of rank j, such that(i) vJ (r) < vI(r); (ii) for every r′ ∈ P s<i with the rank
j, vJ (r
′) ≤ vJ (r′); and (iii) for every r′ ∈ P s<i with
rank less then j, vJ (r′) = vI(r′). We note that, since
µ(P<i) = µ(P ), J ∈ µ(P ). Moreover, j < i and so the
sets of rules with ranks less than or equal to j in P s and
P s<i coincide. Thus, J >P I follows and, consequently,
I /∈ pi(P ). ✷
We give the next two lemmas without proofs, as they are
easy consequences of results by Ferraris [2005] and Ferraris
and Lifschitz [2005].
Lemma 22 Let P be a theory, I an interpretation, and let
Π[I] = {a → ⊥ | a /∈ I} ∪ {¬a → ⊥ | a ∈ I}. Then,
AS(P ∪ Π[I]) = Mod(P ∪ Π [I ]) = {I}.
Lemma 23 Let P be a theory, I, J two of its (classical)
models such that I 6= J , and let
Π[I, J ] = {a ∨ b | a ∈ I, b ∈ J}
∪ {a ∨ ¬b | a ∈ I, b /∈ J}
∪ {¬a ∨ b | a /∈ I, b ∈ J}
∪ {¬a ∨ ¬b | a /∈ I, b /∈ J}.
Then AS(P ∪Π[I, J ]) = Mod(P ∪ Π [I , J ])) = {I, J}.
Lemma 24 Let P be an optimization problem, I ∈
pi(P<j), where j ≥ 1, and let
Rj [I] = {a > ⊤
j
← | a ∈ I}∪{¬a > ⊤
j
← | a ∈ U \ I)}.
Then
1. I ∈ pi(P ∪Rj [I]);
2. for every J such that J 6= I and I ≥P≤j J , I >P∪Rj [I] J .
Proof. When proving (1), to simplify the notation, we write
R for Rj [I]. Since I ∈ pi(P<j), I ∈ µ(P ). Clearly, µ(P ∪
R) = µ(P ) and so, I ∈ µ(P ∪R). To show that I ∈ pi(P ∪
R), let us consider an arbitrary interpretation J ∈ µ(P ∪R)
and assume that J >P∪R I . In particular, J 6= I and so,
diff R(I, J) = j. If diff P (I, J) < j, then diff P∪R(I, J) <
j. Consequently, J >(P∪R)<j I . Since all rules in R are
of rank j, it follows that J >P<j I , a contradiction with
the fact that I ∈ pi(P<j). Thus, diff P (I, J) ≥ j. Since
diff R(I, J) = j, we have diff P∪R(I, J) = j. Therefore,
J >P∪R I implies J >R I , a contradiction again (since, by
definition of Rj [I] = R, I ≥R J for each interpretation J).
It follows that for every J ∈ µ(P ∪ R), J 6>P∪R I , that is,
I ∈ pi(P ∪R).
The assertion (2) is evident, since by definition of
Rj [I] = R, I >
R J for each interpretation J 6= I . ✷
Lemma 25 Let P be an optimization problem, I, J inter-
pretations such that I, J ∈ pi(P<j), where j ≥ 1, and let
R′j [I, J ] ∈ L
s,≥j
U be the union of the following sets of rules:
{a > ⊤
j
← | a ∈ I ∩ J}
{¬a > ⊤
j
← | a ∈ U \ (I ∪ J))}
{a ∨ b > ⊤
j
← | a ∈ I \ J, b ∈ J \ I}
{¬a ∨ ¬b > ⊤
j
← | a ∈ I \ J, b ∈ J \ I}
{(a ∧ b) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬b) > ⊤
j
← | a, b ∈ (I \ J) ∪ (J \ I)}.
Then
1. for every r ∈ R′j [I, J ], vI(r) = vJ(r) = 1;
2. if I >P J , then J /∈ pi(P ∪R′j [I, J ]);
3. for every interpretation K /∈ {I, J}, there is a rule r ∈
R′j [I, J ] such that vK(r) = 2;
4. if I 6>P J , then J ∈ pi(P ∪R′j [I, J ]).
Proof. To simplify the notation, we write R′ for R′j [I, J ].
The assertion (1) is evident. Moreover, combined with
I >P J , it yields I >P∪R′ J . Thus, the assertion (2) holds.
To prove the assertion (3), we consider an interpretation
K that is different from I and from J , and we show that
there is a rule r ∈ R′ such that vK(r) = 2.
Let us consider a ∈ I ∩ J . The rule ra = a > ⊤
j
←
belongs to R′. If vK(ra) = 2, we are done. Thus, let us
assume that for every a ∈ I ∩ J , vK(ra) = 1, where ra =
a > ⊤
j
←. Consequently, for every a ∈ I ∩ J , a ∈ K , that
is, I ∩ J ⊆ K . Taking into account rules ¬a > ⊤ j←, with
a ∈ U \ (I ∪ J) and reasoning in the same way, we show
that K ⊆ I ∪ J .
Let us assume that (I ∩ J) ⊂ K ⊂ (I ∪ J) holds. Then,
there is a ∈ I ∪ J such that a /∈ K . Without loss of gen-
erality we can assume that a ∈ I . From (I ∩ J) ⊂ K ,
it follows that a /∈ J . Further, there is b ∈ K such that
b /∈ I ∩ J . Since K ⊂ (I ∪ J) holds, b ∈ I ∪ J . It follows
that a, b ∈ (I \ J) ∪ (J \ I). Thus, vK(r) = 2, where r is
the corresponding rule from R′.
Thus, only two possibilities forK remain: K = I∩J and
K = I ∪ J . It follows that I \ J 6= ∅ (otherwise, I = K)
and J \ I 6= ∅ (otherwise, J = K). Let a′ ∈ I \ J and
b′ ∈ J \ I . Then R′ contains rules r = a′ ∨ b′ > ⊤ j←
and s = ¬a′ ∨ ¬b′ > ⊤ j←. If K = I ∩ J , vK(r) = 2. If
K = I ∪ J , vK(s) = 2.
To prove the assertion (4), we note first that (1) and
I 6>P J together imply that I 6>P∪R′ J . Next, we note that
if diff P (J,K) < j, then since J ∈ pi(P<j), K 6>P∪R
′
J .
If diff P (J,K) ≥ j, then the property proved above implies
that K 6>P∪R′ J . Since K is an arbitrary interpretation dif-
ferent from I and J , and since I 6>P∪R′ J , J ∈ pi(P ∪ R′)
follows. ✷
We also note a property here that allows us to infer the
strong sel-equivalence of two problems treated as CO prob-
lems from the strong sel-equivalence the these problems
when treated as ASO problems (and conversely). The prop-
erty relies on the fact that changing selectors only does not
affect the class of outcomes. The proof is simple and we
omit it.
Lemma 26 Let P andQ be optimization problems such that
Mod(Pg ) = AS(P g) and Mod(Qg) = AS (Qg). Then,
P ≡s,≥i Q (P ≡s,=i Q, respectively), when P and Q are
viewed as CO problems, if and only if P ≡s,≥i Q (P ≡s,=i
Q), when P and Q are viewed as ASO problems.
The final results in this section will be useful for the com-
plexity results.
Lemma 27 Deciding whether open QBFs ∀Y φ(X,Y )
∀Y ψ(X,Y ) have the same minimal models is ΠP3 -hard.
Proof. We show the result by a reduction from the ΠP3 -
hard problem of deciding satisfiability for QBFs of the form
∀Z∃X∀Y χ. Let Φ be a QBF of such a form and consider
the following formulas, where Z ′ = {z′ | z ∈ Z}, u and v
are fresh atoms:
φ =
∧
z∈Z
(z ↔ ¬z′) ∧
(
(
∧
x∈X
x ∧ u) ∨ χ
)
∧ (v ∨ ¬v)
ψ =
∧
z∈Z
(z ↔ ¬z′) ∧
(
(
∧
x∈X
x ∧ v) ∨ χ
)
∧ (u ∨ ¬u)
Hence, the only difference between φ compared to ψ is that
we use u and v interchangably. Also note that the only point
of including the conjuncts v∨¬v and u∨¬u is to have occur-
rences of u and v in both φ and ψ. We show that ∀Y φ(U, Y )
and ∀Y ψ(U, Y ) have the same minimal models (with open
variables U = Z ∪Z ′ ∪X ∪ {u, v}) if and only if Φ is true.
Only-if direction: Assume Φ is false. Then, there exists
an assignment I ⊆ Z , such that for all assignments to X ,
∀Y χ is false. We show that Mu = I ∪ (Z \ I)′ ∪X ∪{u} is
a minimal model of ∀Y φ. Indeed, it is a model of ∀Y φ and
by the conjunction∧z∈Z(z ↔ ¬z′) the only candidates for
modelsN ⊂Mu of ∀Y φ are of the form I∪(Z\I)′∪J with
J ⊂ X ∪ {u}, but then ∀Y χ (note that we can safely shift
in φ the quantifier ∀Y in front of χ since χ hosts the only
occurrences of atoms from Y in φ) would be true under I ∪
(J \ {u}), a contradiction to our assumption. By essentially
the same arguments, it can be shown that Mv = I ∪ (Z \
I)′∪X ∪{v} is a minimal model of ∀Y ψ. SinceMu 6=Mv
we have shown that ∀Y φ and ∀Y ψ have different minimal
models.
If-direction: Suppose ∀Y φ and ∀Y ψ have different mini-
mal models. The only relevant difference between φ and ψ
is the conjunction (∧x∈X x∧u) in φ, resp. (
∧
x∈X x∧v) in
ψ. We can conclude that the different minimal models are
of the form Mu = I ∪ (Z \ I)′ ∪X ∪ {u} being a minimal
model of ∀Y φ and Mv = I ∪ (Z \ I)′ ∪ X ∪ {v} being a
minimal model of ∀Y ψ. Let us consider Mu. Since it is a
minimal model, there is no proper subset of Mu which is a
model of ∀Y φ, in particular there is no N ⊂ X ∪ {u} such
that I ∪ (Z \ I)′ ∪ N is a model of ∀Y φ. From this we
observe that, for no such N , I ∪ (Z \ I)′ ∪ N is a model
of (
∧
x∈X x ∧ u) ∨ χ
)
, which implies that for no such N ,
I ∪ (Z \ I)′ ∪ (N \ {u}) is a model of ∀Y χ. But then Φ is
false, since we have found an interpretation I ⊆ Z such that
for no J ⊆ X , ∀Y χ is true under I ∪ J . ✷
Lemma 28 Given a ranked preference rule r, and an in-
terpretation I , calculating vI(r) can be done in polynomial
time.
Proof. Initialize a variable x with 1. Starting from i = 1
check whether I |= hd i(r), and if so, set x to i and halt;
otherwise increment i and continue checking; if no more
heads exist in r, halt. Each of the checks is a model
checking task for a propositional formula and hence in
polynomial time. Upon halting, x is equal to vI(r). ✷
Lemma 29 Given an optimization problem P and two in-
terpretations I, J , calculating diff P (I, J) can be done in
polynomial time.
Proof. Initialize a variable x with ∞, scan the rules in
P s and for each ranked preference rule r ∈ P s, deter-
mine whether vI(r) 6= vJ(r) (in polynomial time due to
Lemma 28). If so, set x to rank(r) if rank(r) < x. After
having processed all rules, x is equal to diff P (I, J). ✷
Lemma 30 Given an optimization problem P , and two in-
terpretations I, J , deciding whether I >P J can be done in
polynomial time.
Proof. First, sort the rules in P s by their ranks. Starting
from the lowest rank upwards, do the following for each
rank i: Check for all rules of rank i whether vI(r) < vJ (r)
or vI(r) ≤ vJ (r). If vI(r) < vJ (r) holds at least for
one rule and vI(r) ≤ vJ(r) for all other rules of rank i,
accept. If there are rules r and r′ of the rank i such that
vI(r) < vJ(r) and vI(r′) > vJ (r′), reject. If all ranks have
been processed, reject. By Lemma 28, all steps are doable
in polynomial time. ✷
Lemma 31 Given a classical optimization problem P and
an interpretation I , deciding whether I ∈ pi(P ) is in co-NP.
Proof. We show that a witness J for the complementary
problem (deciding whether I /∈ pi(P )) can be verified in
polynomial time. If J = I , verify in polynomial time that
I does not satisfy the propositional theory P g, which is
well-known to be feasible in polynomial time. Otherwise,
verify in polynomial time that J satisfies P g and that
J >P I (both in polynomial time, the latter by Lemma 30).
✷
Lemma 32 Given an answer set optimization problem P
and an interpretation I , deciding whether I ∈ pi(P ) is in
ΣP2 .
Proof. We show that a witness J for the complementary
problem (deciding whether I /∈ pi(P )) can be verified in
polynomial time using an NP oracle. If J = I , verify that I
does not satisfy P g using theNP oracle. This is possible be-
cause answer-set checking is co-NP-complete (Theorem 8
of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). Otherwise, verify
using the NP oracle that J satisfies the propositional theory
P g and that J >P I (in polynomial time by Lemma 30). ✷
Appendix B: Proofs
Theorem 2 For every ranked optimization problems P and
Q, and every rank intervals [i, j], P ≡s,[i,j] Q if and only if
the following conditions hold:
1. pi(P<i) = pi(Q<i)
2. >P
pi(P<i)
= >Q
pi(Q<i)
3. For every I, J ∈ pi(P<i) such that i < diff P (I, J) or
i < diff Q(I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or both
diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) > j.
Proof. (⇐) Let R ∈ Ls,[i,j]U and let I ∈ pi(P ∪ R). By
Lemma 21, I ∈ pi((P ∪ R)<i). Since R ∈ Ls,[i,j]U , R<i =
(∅, ∅). Thus, I ∈ pi(P<i). By assumption, it follows that
I ∈ pi(Q<i). In particular, I ∈ µ(Q<i) and, as µ(Q<i) =
µ(Q), I ∈ µ(Q). Since Rg = ∅, we have I ∈ µ(Q ∪ R).
To show that I ∈ pi(Q∪R) we have to show that there is no
J ∈ µ(Q ∪ R) such that J >Q∪R I . Let us assume to the
contrary that such a J exists. By Lemma 20, there are three
possibilities.
First, we assume that diff Q(I, J) < diff R(I, J) and
J >Q I . The latter property implies diff Q(I, J) ≥ i (oth-
erwise, we would have J >Q<i I , contrary to I ∈ pi(Q<i)).
In particular, we have I ≈Q<i J and, since I ∈ pi(Q<i), it
follows that J ∈ pi(Q<i). By (1), J ∈ pi(P<i). Thus, by (2),
J >P I . If diff Q(I, J) ≥ j then diff R(I, J) > j and, as
R ∈ L
s,[i,j]
U , diff
R(I, J) = ∞. Since J >P I , J >P∪R I .
Otherwise, i ≤ diff Q(I, J) < j. If i < diff Q(I, J) then,
by (3), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J). If i = diff Q(I, J), then
again by (3), diff P (I, J) ≤ i. In either case, diff P (I, J) <
diff R(I, J). Since J >P I , J >P∪R I .
Next, let us assume that diff Q(I, J) > diff R(I, J)
and J >R I . Since R ∈ Ls,[i,j]U , it follows that
diff R(I, J) ≥ i and so, diff Q(I, J) > i. We recall
that I ∈ pi(Q<i). Thus, J ∈ pi(Q<i) and, consequently,
J ∈ pi(P<i). If diff Q(I, J) ≤ j then, by (3), diff P (I, J) =
diff Q(I, J) and so, diff P (I, J) > diff R(I, J). If j <
diff Q(I, J) then, also by (3), j < diff P (I, J). Since
diff Q(I, J) > diff R(I, J), diff R(I, J) < ∞ and, conse-
quently, diff R(I, J) ≤ j. Thus, diff P (I, J) > diff R(I, J)
in this case, too. Since J >R I , J >P∪R I follows.
Finally, let us assume that diff Q(I, J) = diff R(I, J),
J >Q I and J >R I . Since R ∈ Ls,[i,j]U , diff
R(I, J) ≥ i.
Thus, diff Q(I, J) ≥ i and, since I ∈ pi(Q<i), J ∈ pi(Q<i).
By (1) we have J ∈ pi(P<i) and, by (2), J >P I . Conse-
quently, J >P∪R I .
In all cases we obtained J >P∪R I , contrary to I ∈
pi(P ∪R), a contradiction.
(⇒) Let us assume that pi(P<i) 6= pi(Q<i). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that there is I ∈ pi(P<i)\pi(Q<i)
and define R = (∅, Ri[I]) ∈ Ls,=iU , where Ri[I] is as in
Lemma 24. By that lemma, I ∈ pi(P ∪ R). On the other
hand, since I /∈ pi(Q<i) and R ∈ Ls,=iU , I /∈ pi((Q∪R)<i).
By Lemma 21, I /∈ pi(Q ∪ R). Thus, P 6≡s,=i Q, contrary
to the assumption.
It follows that pi(P<i) = pi(Q<i), that is, that the con-
dition (1) holds. To prove the condition (2), let us con-
sider interpretations I, J ∈ pi(P<i) such that I >P J .
Let R′i[I, J ] be the selector defined in Lemma 25. Since
I >P J , Lemma 25(2) implies that J /∈ pi(P ∪ R′i[I, J ]).
Consequently, J /∈ pi(Q∪R′i[I, J ]). By Lemma 25(4), it fol-
lows that I >Q J . By symmetry, I >Q J implies I >P J
and so, the condition (2) holds.
To prove the condition (3), let us assume that there are in-
terpretations I and J that satisfy the assumptions but violate
the corresponding conclusion. In what follows, we write p
for diff P (I, J) and q for diff Q(I, J). Thus, we have p > i
or q > i, p 6= q, and p ≤ j or q ≤ j. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that p < q. It follows that p is
finite and, consequently, that diff P (I, J) < ∞ and I 6= J .
Moreover, i < q and p ≤ j.
Let us assume first that p < i. We take the problem R =
(∅, Ri[J ]), where Ri[J ] is as specified in Lemma 24 and
define P ′ = P ∪ R and Q′ = Q ∪ R. Since I, J ∈ pi(P<i)
we also have I, J ∈ pi(Q<i). By our assumptions, q > i.
Thus, J ≈Q≤i I and, in particular, J ≥Q≤i I . We recall
that I 6= J . Consequently, by the assertion (2) of Lemma 24
we have that J >Q′ I . Since all rules in R have ranks i, we
have I, J ∈ pi(P ′<i) and diff
P ′(I, J) = diff P (I, J) < i.
It follows that J 6>P ′ I (otherwise, by diff P ′(I, J) < i we
would have J >P ′<i I). Let us define R′ = (∅, R′i[I, J ]),
whereR′i[I, J ] is as specified in Lemma 25. Since J 6>P
′
I ,
by the assertion (4) of that lemma, I ∈ pi(P ′∪R′). We have
P ′ ∪R′ = P ∪ (R ∪R′). Thus, I ∈ pi(P ∪ (R ∪R′)) and,
by P ≡s,[i,j] Q, I ∈ pi(Q ∪ (R ∪ R′)) = pi(Q′ ∪ R′). By
the assertion (2) of Lemma 25, J 6>Q′ I , a contradiction.
Next, let p = i. Clearly, I 6>P J or J 6>P I . With-
out loss of generality, let us assume that J 6>P I . Let
R′ = (∅, Ri[I, J ]), and let us define P ′ = P ∪R′ and Q′ =
Q ∪ R′. Since all rules in R′ have ranks i, I, J ∈ pi(P<i)
implies I, J ∈ pi(P ′<i). Moreover, from J 6>P I it follows
by Lemma 25(1) that J 6>P ′ I . Let R = (∅, Ri[J ]). All
rules in R have rank i, diff P
′
(I, J) = diff P (I, J) = i (the
first equality holds by Lemma 25(1) and J 6>P ′ I . Thus, it
follows that J 6>P ′∪R I . Moreover, for every K /∈ {I, J},
if diff P
′
(K, I) < i, then K 6>P ′∪R I follows from I ∈
pi(P ′<i). If diff
P ′(K, I) ≥ i, thenK 6>P ′∪R I follows from
Lemma 25(3). Thus, I ∈ pi(P ′ ∪R). On the other hand, we
recall that diff Q(I, J) = q > i. Thus, diff Q
′
(I, J) > i, too
(Lemma 25(1)). It follows that J ≥Q′≤i I . Consequently, by
Lemma 24(2), we have J >Q′∪R I . Thus, I /∈ pi(Q′ ∪ R),
a contradiction.
It follows that p > i. To complete the proof of (3), we
recall that p ≤ j. Clearly, I 6>P J or J 6>P I . Without
loss of generality, let us assume that J 6>P I . Let R′ =
(∅, Ri[I, J ]), and let us define P ′ = P ∪ R′ and Q′ = Q ∪
R′. Let us assume that for some interpretation K /∈ {I, J},
K >P
′
I . By Lemma 25(3), it follows that diff P ′(I,K) <
i. Thus, diff P (I,K) < i, a contradiction with I ∈ pi(P<i).
Thus, for every interpretation K /∈ {I, J}, K 6>P ′ I and,
by the same argument, K 6>P ′ J . Consequently, for every
interpretation K /∈ {I, J}, K 6>P
′
<p I and K 6>P
′
<p J . In
addition, since I, J ∈ pi(P<i), by Lemma 25(1) we obtain
that neither I >P
′
<p J nor J >P
′
<p I . Thus, I, J ∈ pi(P ′<p).
In addition, by Lemma 25(1), diff P ′(I, J) = diff P (I, J) =
p and, since J 6>P I , J 6>P ′ I .
Let R = (∅, Rp[J ]). As diff P
′
(I, J) = p, J 6>P
′
I ,
and all rules in R have rank p, it follows that J 6>P ′∪R I .
Moreover, for every K /∈ {I, J}, if diff P
′
(K, I) < i, then
K 6>P
′∪R I follows from I ∈ pi(P ′<i). If diff
P ′(K, I) ≥ i,
then K 6>P ′∪R I follows from Lemma 25(3) (and the defi-
nition of P ′). Thus, I ∈ pi(P ′ ∪ R). On the other hand, we
recall that diff Q(I, J) = q > p. Thus, diff Q
′
(I, J) > p,
too (Lemma 25(1)). It follows that J ≥Q′≤p I . Conse-
quently, by Lemma 24(2), we have J >Q′∪R I . Thus,
I /∈ pi(Q′ ∪R), a contradiction (we recall that P ≡s,[i,j] Q,
P ′ = P ∪ (R ∪ R′), Q′ = Q ∪ (R ∪ R′), and, as p ≤ j,
R ∪R′ ∈ L
s,[i,j]
U ). ✷
Theorem 9 For every two CO (ASO, respectively) problems
P and Q, P ≡g Q if and only if P g and Qg are strongly
equivalent (that is, Mod(Pg) = Mod(Qg) for CO prob-
lems, and ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg) for ASO problems)
and >P
Mod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg).
Proof. (⇐) The first assumption implies strong equivalence
of the generators P g and Qg relative to the corresponding
semantics (we recall that in the case of classical semantics,
strong and standard equivalence coincide). It follows that for
every problemR ∈ LgU , µ(P ∪R) = µ(Q ∪R). Moreover,
for each semantics, µ(P∪R) ⊆ Mod(P g∪Rg) ⊆ Mod(P g)
and, similarly, µ(Q ∪ R) ⊆ Mod(Qg ∪ Rg) ⊆ Mod(Qg).
Since>P
Mod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg), andR ∈ L
g
U does not change
preferences, we have>P∪R
µ(P g∪Rg) = >
Q∪R
µ(Qg∪Rg). By Lemma
19, pi(P ∪R) = pi(Q ∪R).
(⇒) Let us assume that P g and Qg are not strongly equiva-
lent. Then, there is a problemR ∈ LgU such that µ(P ∪R) 6=
µ(Q ∪ R). Without loss of generality, we can assume that
for some interpretation I , I ∈ µ(P ∪ R) \ µ(Q ∪ R). Let
us define a problem T ∈ LgU by setting T = (Π[I], ∅),
where Π[I] is as defined in Lemma 22. By that lemma,
µ(P ∪ R ∪ T ) = {I} and µ(Q ∪ R ∪ T ) = ∅. The for-
mer property implies that I is necessarily preferred, that
is I ∈ pi(P ∪ R ∪ T ), and the latter one implies that
pi(Q∪R∪T ) = ∅. This is a contradiction with the assump-
tion that P ≡g Q. Thus, P g and Qg are strongly equivalent,
that is, Mod(P g) = Mod(Qg), in the case P and Q are CO
problems, and ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg), in the case P
and Q are ASO problems.
Since ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg) implies
Mod(P g) = Mod(Qg), the identity holds in each of
the two cases. Because of the equality, we will write M
for both Mod(P g) and Mod(Qg). It remains to show
that >PM=>
Q
M . Towards a contradiction, let us assume
that there are I, J ∈ M that are in exactly one of these
two relations; without loss of generality we will assume
that I >P J and I 6>Q J . The former identity implies,
in particular, that I 6= J . Let T = (Π[I, J ], ∅), where
Π[I, J ] is a theory defined in Lemma 23. By that lemma,
µ(P ∪T ) = µ(Q∪T ) = {I, J}. Clearly, J /∈ pi(P ∪T ) and
J ∈ pi(Q∪ T ), contrary to our assumption that P ≡g Q. ✷
Theorem 11 For every ranked CO (ASO, respectively) prob-
lems P and Q, and every rank intervals [i, j], P ≡s,[i,j]g Q
if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. P g and Qg are strongly equivalent (that is, Mod(Pg ) =
Mod(Qg) for CO problems, and ModHT (P g) =
ModHT (Q
g) for ASO problems)
2. >P
Mod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg)
3. For every I, J ∈ Mod(P g) such that i < diff P (I, J)
or i < diff Q(I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or both
diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) > j
4. >P<i
Mod(Pg) = >
Q<i
Mod(Qg).
Proof. The condition (1) is equivalent to the property that
P g and Qg are strongly equivalent relative to the corre-
sponding semantics. Using this observation, we will provide
a single argument for the two versions of the assertion.
(⇐) By Proposition 1, it suffices to prove that for every
R ∈ LgU , P ∪ R ≡
s,[i,j] Q ∪ R. By our comment
above, we have that µ(P ∪ R) = µ(Q ∪ R) (we recall
that µ(P ) denotes the set of outcomes of an optimization
problem P ; µ(P ) = Mod(P g) in the case of CO prob-
lems, and µ(P ) = AS(P g) in the case of ASO prob-
lems). Moreover, for each type of problems, we also have
µ(P ∪ R) ⊆ Mod(Pg ∪ Rg) ⊆ Mod(Pg ) and, simi-
larly, µ(Q ∪ R) ⊆ Mod(Qg ∪ Rg) ⊆ Mod(Qg). Since
all rules in R have rank at least i, by the condition (4)
it follows that >(P∪R)<i
µ(P∪R) =>
(Q∪R)<i
µ(Q∪R) . By Lemma 19, we
have pi((P ∪ R)<i) = pi((Q ∪ R)<i) and so, the condi-
tion (1) of Theorem 2 holds for P ∪ R and Q ∪ R. Since
pi((P ∪R)<i) ⊆ µ(P ∪R) ⊆ Mod(Pg), and since the cor-
responding inclusions hold forQ, too, the conditions (2)–(3)
of this theorem for P and Q imply the conditions (2)–(3)
from Theorem 2 for P ∪ R and Q ∪ R. Thus, by Theorem
2, P ∪R ≡s,[i,j] Q ∪R.
(⇒) Let us assume that P ≡s,[i,j]g Q. Then, P ≡g Q follows
and, by Theorem 9, implies the appropriate version of the
condition (1). Since ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg) implies
Mod(Pg ) = Mod(Qg), for each of the two versions of the
assertion we have Mod(Pg ) = Mod(Qg ). From now on
in the proof, we write M for Mod(Pg ) and, because of the
equality, also for Mod(Qg).
Next, for interpretations I, J ∈ M , I 6= J , we define
R = (Π[I, J ], ∅), where Π[I, J ] is as in Lemma 23. Let us
define P1 = P ∪ R and Q1 = Q ∪ R. We have P1 ≡s,[i,j]
Q1. Moreover, by Lemma 23, we also have that µ(P1) =
µ(Q1) = {I, J}.
To prove the condition (4), let us assume that I >P<i J .
It follows that I >P1 J (we recall that R contains no
preference rules). Since µ(P1) = {I, J}, J /∈ pi(P1)
and I ∈ pi(P1). By the assumption, J /∈ pi(Q1). Since
µ(Q1) = {I, J}, we have that I >Q1 J . In particu-
lar, I ∈ pi(Q1). If diff Q(I, J) < i then, since R has
no preference rules, I >Q<i J . Thus, let us assume that
diff Q(I, J) ≥ i and let us define R′ = (∅, Ri[J ]), where
Ri[J ] is as in Lemma 24. Since I >P<i J , R has no pref-
erence rules and all preference rules in R′ have rank i, it
follows that I >P1∪R′ J . The generator module in R′ is
empty. It follows that µ(P1 ∪ R′) = µ(Q1 ∪ R′) = {I, J}.
Thus, J /∈ pi(P1 ∪ R′) and, consequently, J /∈ pi(Q1 ∪R′).
It follows that I >Q1∪R′ J . Since diff Q(I, J) ≥ i,
diff Q1(I, J) ≥ i. Thus, J ∈ pi(Q1)<i. By Lemma 24,
J ∈ pi(Q1 ∪ R′), a contradiction. The argument shows that
I >P<i J implies I >Q<i J . The converse implication
follows by symmetry and so, the condition (4) holds.
To prove the condition (2), let us assume that I >P J .
If diff P (I, J) < i, then I >P<i J and, by (4), I >Q<i J .
Thus, I >Q J . Let us assume then that diff P (I, J) ≥ i.
Since µ(P1) = {I, J} and since I >P J implies I >P1 J ,
J /∈ pi(P1). Thus, J /∈ pi(Q1). Since µ(Q1) = {I, J},
I >Q1 J and so, I >Q J .
To prove the condition (3), without loss of generality
we assume that i < diff P (I, J). Thus, we also have
i < diff P1(I, J) and that I, J ∈ pi((P1)<i), the latter
follows from the properties that µ(P1) = {I, J} and that
diff P1(I, J) = diff P (I, J) > i. Since P1 ≡s,[i,j] Q1,
the condition (3) of Theorem 2 holds for P1, Q1, I
and J , that is, diff P1(I, J) = diff Q1(I, J) or both
diff P1(I, J) > j and diff Q1(I, J) > j. Consequently,
diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or both diff P (I, J) > j and
diff Q(I, J) > j, that is, the condition (3) holds. ✷
Theorem 15 Given optimization problems P andQ, decid-
ing P ≡s Q is co-NP-complete in case of CO-problems and
ΠP2 -complete in case of ASO-problems.
Proof. By Corollary 4, P ≡s Q iff jointly (1)
µ(P ) = µ(Q), (2) for every I, J ∈ µ(P ), diff P (I, J) =
diff Q(I, J), and (3) >Pµ(P ) = >Qµ(Q).
For membership, we consider the complementary prob-
lem, that is, deciding whether (a) µ(P ) 6= µ(Q), or (b)
for some I, J ∈ µ(P ), diff P (I, J) 6= diff Q(I, J), or (c)
>P
µ(P ) 6= >
Q
µ(Q), and show that it is in NP for CO-problems
and in ΣP2 for ASO-problems. To do this, we show that a
witness consisting of two interpretations can be verified in
polynomial time, which in case of ASO-problems uses an
NP oracle.
Consider therefore such a witness (I, J) of two interpreta-
tions. We first test for I ∈ µ(P ), I ∈ µ(Q), J ∈ µ(P ), and
J ∈ µ(Q). In case of CO problems, each of these tests cor-
responds to model checking in classical propositional logic,
which is well-known to be feasible in polynomial time. In
case of ASP problems, we require one call each to an NP
oracle, since answer-set checking is co-NP-complete (The-
orem 8 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). If I ∈
µ(P )∆µ(Q) or J ∈ µ(P )∆µ(Q) (where ∆ denotes the
symmetric difference), condition (a) is satisfied and the al-
gorithm accepts. If I /∈ µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q) or I /∈ µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q),
(I, J) is no witness for the satisfaction of any of the condi-
tions (a), (b), (c), and the algorithm rejects.
At this point, both I, J are known to be in µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q).
Next, compute p = diff P (I, J) and q = diff Q(I, J). By
Lemma 29, this can be done in polynomial time. If p 6= q,
condition (b) is satisfied and the algorithm accepts. Next,
check for I >P J and I >Q J , which by Lemma 30 can
be done in polynomial time. Since I, J ∈ µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q),
we have in fact checked for I >Pµ(P ) J and I >
Q
µ(Q) J . In
case exactly one of the two holds, we accept, otherwise we
reject. This yields a nondeterministic algorithm to decide
P 6≡s Q which runs in polynomial time (in case of ASO-
problem with access to anNP-oracle), and yields the desired
upper bounds.
For hardness, we observe that in case of problems with
empty selectors, ≡s coincides with equivalence of propo-
sitional theories in case of CO-problems, and with equiva-
lence of equilibrium theories in case of ASO-problems. The
former is well known to be co-NP-hard, the latter is ΠP2 -
hard (Theorem 11 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)).
✷
Theorem 16 Given optimization problems P and Q and
rank interval [i, j], deciding P ≡s,[i,j] Q is ΠP2 -complete
in case of CO-problems and ΠP3 -complete in case of ASO-
problems.
Proof. By Theorem 2, P ≡s,[i,j] Q iff jointly (1) pi(P<i) =
pi(Q<i), (2) >Ppi(P<i) = >
Q
pi(Q<i)
, and (3) for every I, J ∈
pi(P<i) such that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q(I, J),
diff P (I, J) = diff Q(I, J) or both diff P (I, J) > j and
diff Q(I, J) > j.
For membership, we consider the complementary prob-
lem, that is, deciding whether (a) pi(P<i) 6= pi(Q<i),
(b) >P
pi(P<i)
6= >Q
pi(Q<i)
, or (c) for some I, J ∈
pi(P<i) such that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q(I, J),
diff P (I, J) 6= diff Q(I, J) and it holds that diff P (I, J) ≤ j
or diff Q(I, J) ≤ j. We show that it is in ΣP2 for CO-
problems and in ΣP3 for ASO-problems by showing that a
witness consisting of two interpretations can be verified in
polynomial time, using an NP oracle when dealing with a
CO-problem and a ΣP2 oracle when dealing with an ASO-
problem.
Consider a witness (I, J) of two interpretations. We first
test for I ∈ pi(P<i), I ∈ pi(Q<i), J ∈ pi(P<i), and J ∈
pi(Q<i). By Lemma 31, this can be done by a call to an
NP oracle for CO-problems, and by Lemma 32 it can be
done by a call to a ΣP2 oracle for ASO-problems. If I ∈
pi(P<i)∆pi(Q<i) or J ∈ pi(P<i)∆pi(Q<i) (∆ again denotes
the symmetric difference), condition (a) is satisfied and the
algorithm accepts. If I /∈ pi(P<i)∩pi(Q<i) or I /∈ pi(P<i)∩
pi(Q<i), (I, J) is no witness for the satisfaction of any of the
conditions (a), (b), (c), and the algorithm rejects.
Now both I, J are known to be in pi(P<i) ∩ pi(Q<i).
Next, check for I >P J and I >Q J in polynomial time
(by virtue of Lemma 30), which is equivalent to checks for
I >P
pi(P<i)
J and I >Q
pi(Q<i)
J . In case exactly one of the
two holds, we accept. Next, compute p = diff P (I, J) and
q = diff Q(I, J). By Lemma 29, this can be done in poly-
nomial time. Then verify that i < p or i < q, furthermore
p 6= q, and p ≤ j or q ≤ j. If the verification succeeds,
accept, otherwise reject. This yields a nondeterministic al-
gorithm to decide P 6≡s Q which runs in polynomial time
(in case of ASO-problem with access to an NP-oracle), and
yields the desired upper bounds.
For the hardness part, we start with the case of CO prob-
lems. Therefore, we reduce the following problem to sel-
equivalence: given two propositional theories S and T , do
they possess the same minimal models. This problem is
known to be ΠP2 -complete (for instance, equivalence for
positive disjunctive programs is known to ΠP2 -complete,
see e.g. Theorem 6.15 in (Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007),
which means testing whether two propositional formu-
las of a particular class have the same minimal mod-
els). The problem remains hard if S and T are in nega-
tion normal form over the same alphabet. Given a the-
ory T we construct a CO problem PT such that the ele-
ments in pi(PT ) are in a one-to-one correspondence to the
minimal models of T . We adapt a construction used in
(Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2011). Given T (over
atoms U ), we construct
P gT = T [¬u/u
′] ∪ {u↔ ¬u′ | u ∈ U},
where T [¬u/u′] stands for replacing all ¬u by u′ in T , and
P sT = {u
′ > u←| u ∈ U}.
Our first observation is that each outcome of PT must be of
the form X ∪ {y′ | y ∈ U \X} where X ⊆ U . So for each
interpretation I ⊆ U we can associate I+ = I ∪ {y′ | y ∈
U \ I}. It is clear that I |= ¬u if and only if I+ |= u′, and
hence also I |= T if and only if I+ |= T [¬u/u′]. Hence
there is a one-to-one mapping between models M of T and
outcomes M+ of PT .
Now assume that M+ ∈ pi(PT ). Then M |= T , and for
any N ( M we can show that N 6|= T : Indeed if N |=
T would hold, then N+ |= P gT and for rules r ∈ P sT of
the form u′ > u where u ∈ M \ N we obtain vN+(r) =
1 < 2 = vM+(r) and for all other rules r′ in P sT we have
vN+(r) = 2 = vM+(r), henceN+ >PT M+, contradicting
M+ ∈ pi(PT ).
Assume that M is a minimal model of T . Then M+ ∈
µ(PT ) and for all N+ ∈ µ(PT ) we can show that N+ >PT
M+ does not hold (implying M+ ∈ pi(PT )): If N+ >PT
M+ would hold, then vN+(r) < vM+(r) for at least one
r ∈ P sT and vN+(r) ≤ vM+(r) for all r′ ∈ P sT . This of
course implies N ( M and since N |= T it contradicts the
assumption that M is a minimal model of T .
We thus have thatM+ ∈ pi(PT ) if and only ifM is a min-
imal model of T . Moreover, for S and T over U it follows
that S and T have the same minimal models if and only if
PS ≡s,≥2 PT . Indeed, for anyR ∈ Ls,≥2U it is easy to verify
that pi(Ps) = pi(PS ∪R) and pi(PT ) = pi(PT ∪R), since for
no I, J ∈ µ(PS) it holds that I ≈PS J and neither for any
I, J ∈ µ(PT ) it holds that I ≈PT J .
Concerning hardness for ASO problems, we can use a
similar idea. However, we shall use the following problem:
given two open QBFs ∀Y φ(X,Y ), ∀Y ψ(X,Y ), do these
two QBFs possess the same minimal models. By Lemma 27,
this problem is ΠP3 -hard. We can assume that φ and ψ are in
negation normal form. The reduction then combines the idea
from above with the reduction for general ASP consistency
(Eiter and Gottlob 1995). More precisely, we construct Pφ
for a given φ(X,Y ) as follows:
P gφ = {z ∨ z
′ | z ∈ X ∪ Y } ∪
{(y ∧ y′)→ w,w → y, w → y′ | y ∈ Y } ∪
{φ[¬z/z′]→ w,¬w → w},
where φ[¬z/z′] stands for replacing all ¬z by z′ in φ(X,Y ).
For the selector we set
P sφ = {x
′ > x←| x ∈ X}.
Any equilibrium model M of P gφ must contain w (other-
wise ¬w → w would be unsatisfied), and it must also con-
tain all of {y, y′ | y ∈ Y } (otherwise w → y, w → y′
would be unsatisfied); let W denote {y, y′ | y ∈ Y } ∪ {w},
the set contained in each equilibrium model. Moreover,
each equilibrium model M must be of the form V ∪ {z′ |
z ∈ X \ V } ∪ W : clearly one of x and x′ must hold for
each x ∈ X to satisfy v ∨ v′, but not both, as otherwise
〈M \ {v},M〉 |=HT P
g
φ as well. We can therefore associate
each interpretation I ⊆ X for ∀Y φ(X,Y ) to exactly one po-
tential equilibrium model I+ = I ∪ {x′ | x ∈ X \ I} ∪W .
Moreover, we can show that I satisfies ∀Y φ(X,Y ) if and
only if I+ is an equilibrium model of P gφ : If I satisfies
∀Y φ(X,Y ), then clearly 〈I+, I+〉 |=HT P gφ and for all
J ( I+ it holds that 〈J, I+〉 6|=HT P gφ ; if I does not sat-
isfy ∀Y φ(X,Y ) then there exists some J ⊆ Y such that
I∪J 6|= φ(X,Y ), therefore even if 〈I+, I+〉 |=HT P gφ , also
〈I+ \ ({y | y /∈ J} ∪ {y′ | y ∈ J} ∪ {w}), I+〉 |=HT P
g
φ
(the first component of the HT interpretation is of the form
I ∪ {x′ | x ∈ X \ I} ∪ J ∪ {y′ | y ∈ Y \ J} and hence
does not satisfy φ[¬z/z′]) and hence in this case I+ is not
an equilibrium model. So there is a one-to-one mapping be-
tween models M of ∀Y φ(X,Y ) and outcomes M+ of Pφ.
Once this is established, we can reason as for CO-
problems concerning minimality. Assume first that
M+ ∈ pi(Pφ). Then M satisfies ∀Y φ(X,Y ), and for any
N ( M we can show that N does not satisfy ∀Y φ(X,Y ):
Indeed if N would satisfy ∀Y φ(X,Y ), then N+ ∈ µ(Pφ)
and for rules r ∈ P sφ of the form u′ > u where u ∈ M \N
we obtain vN+(r) = 1 < 2 = vM+(r) and for all other
rules r′ in P sφ we have vN+(r) = 2 = vM+(r), hence
N+ >Pφ M+, contradicting M+ ∈ pi(Pφ). Assume
next that M is a minimal model of ∀Y φ(X,Y ). Then
M+ ∈ µ(Pφ) and for all N+ ∈ µ(Pφ) we can show that
N+ >Pφ M+ does not hold (implying M+ ∈ pi(Pφ)):
If N+ >Pφ M+ would hold, then vN+(r) < vM+(r)
for at least one r ∈ P sφ and vN+(r) ≤ vM+(r) for all
r′ ∈ P sφ . This of course implies N ( M and since N
satisfies ∀Y φ(X,Y ) it contradicts the assumption that M
is a minimal model of ∀Y φ(X,Y ). We thus have that
M+ ∈ pi(Pφ) if and only if M is a minimal model of
∀Y φ(X,Y ). Moreover, for φ and ψ over X ∪ Y it follows
that ∀Y φ(X,Y ) and ∀Y ψ(X,Y ) have the same minimal
models if and only if Pφ ≡s,≥2 Pψ . Indeed, for any
R ∈ Ls,≥2U it is easy to verify that pi(Pφ) = pi(Pφ ∪R) and
pi(Pψ) = pi(Pψ ∪ R), since for no I, J ∈ µ(Pφ) it holds
that I ≈Pφ J and neither for any I, J ∈ µ(Pψ) it holds that
I ≈Pψ J . ✷
Theorem 17 Given two CO (ASO, respectively) problems
P and Q, deciding P ≡g Q is co-NP-complete.
Proof. By Theorem 9, P ≡g Q if and only
if >P
Mod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg) and for CO problems
Mod(Pg ) = Mod(Qg) and for ASO problems
ModHT (P
g) = ModHT (Q
g). Hardness immedi-
ately follows from co-NP-completeness of testing
Mod(Pg ) = Mod(Qg) and ModHT (P g) = ModHT (Qg)
(Lin 2002). Membership can be shown by verifying a
witness (I, J) for the complementary problem (composed
of two interpretations) in polynomial time: Check in
polynomial time whether I ∈ Mod(Pg ), I ∈ Mod(Qg),
J ∈ Mod(Pg ), J ∈ Mod(Qg). If all checks succeed,
check for I >PMod(Pg) J and I >
Q
Mod(Qg) J (by Lemma 30
I >P J and I >Q J can be checked in polynomial time
and we have I, J ∈ Mod(Pg) and I, J ∈ Mod(Qg)); if one
of them succeeds and the other does not, accept; otherwise,
for CO problems test for I ∈ Mod(Pg )∆Mod(Qg ) or
J ∈ Mod(Pg)∆Mod(Qg) (∆ again denotes the symmetric
difference) and accept if so, reject otherwise; for ASO
problems, check for 〈I, J〉 |=HT P g and 〈I, J〉 |=HT Qg
(in polynomial time); if one of them succeeds and the other
does not, accept, reject otherwise. ✷
Theorem 18 Given ranked CO (ASO, respectively) prob-
lems P andQ, and rank interval [i, j], deciding P ≡s,[i,j]g Q
is co-NP-complete.
Proof. By Theorem 11, P ≡s,[i,j]g Q if and only
if jointly (1) P g and Qg are strongly equivalent (that
is, Mod(Pg) = Mod(Qg) for CO problems, and
ModHT (P
g) = ModHT (Q
g) for ASO problems), (2)
>PMod(Pg) = >
Q
Mod(Qg), (3) for every I, J ∈ Mod(P g) such
that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q(I, J), diff P (I, J) =
diff Q(I, J) or both diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q(I, J) > j,
and (4) >P<i
Mod(Pg) = >
Q<i
Mod(Qg).
For membership, we consider the complementary prob-
lem, that is, deciding whether (a) P g andQg are not strongly
equivalent (that is, Mod(Pg) 6= Mod(Qg ) for CO prob-
lems, and ModHT (P g) 6= ModHT (Qg) for ASO prob-
lems), or (b) >P
Mod(Pg) 6= >
Q
Mod(Qg), (c) for some I, J ∈
Mod(P g) such that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q(I, J),
diff P (I, J) 6= diff Q(I, J) and it holds that diff P (I, J) ≤ j
or diff Q(I, J) ≤ j, and (d) >P<i
Mod(Pg) 6= >
Q<i
Mod(Qg). As in
previous proofs, we will give a polynomial time algorithm
for verifying a witness consisting of two interpretations.
Consider therefore such a witness (I, J) of two interpre-
tations. We first test for I ∈ Mod(Pg ), I ∈ Mod(Qg),
J ∈ Mod(Pg), and J ∈ Mod(Qg). For CO problems, if
I ∈ Mod(Pg )∆Mod(Qg ) or J ∈ Mod(Pg)∆Mod(Qg )
(where ∆ again denotes the symmetric difference), then ac-
cept immediately. For ASO problems, test for 〈I, J〉 |=HT
P g and 〈I, J〉 |=HT Qg (in polynomial time), and if only
one of them holds, then accept. If I /∈ Mod(Pg)∩Mod(Qg )
or J ∈ Mod(Pg) ∩Mod(Qg), reject.
At this point, both I, J are known to be in Mod(Pg) ∩
Mod(Qg). Thus, checking for I >P
Mod(Pg) J and
I >Q
Mod(Qg) J can be done in polynomial time, c.f.
Lemma 30. In case exactly one of the two holds, we ac-
cept. Next, compute p = diff P (I, J) and q = diff Q(I, J).
By Lemma 29, this can be done in polynomial time. Then
verify that i < p or i < q, furthermore p 6= q, and p ≤ j
or q ≤ j. If the verification succeeds, accept. Finally, check
for I >P<i
Mod(Pg) J and I >
Q<i
Mod(Qg) J , which by Lemma 30
can be done in polynomial time. In case exactly one of the
two holds, we accept, otherwise reject.
Hardness follows directly from co-NP-completeness of
deciding equivalence between two propositional theories
and of deciding strong equivalence between two equilibrium
theories (Lin 2002). ✷
